Military News
02-24-2010, 09:51 AM
02-23-2010 10:19 PM
An investigation into a unit of security contractor Xe, formerly known as Blackwater, shows the company didn’t properly vet the people it hired for a training contract in Afghanistan, employees recklessly used firearms they weren’t authorized to have and the Army didn’t provide sufficient oversight of those contractors when mistakes were reported, according to a statement released Tuesday by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, D-Mich.
The 11-page statement summarized the findings of an investigation the committee started six months ago into armed contractors and a unit of Blackwater called Paravant. Levin released the statement one day before a Senate hearing to address security contracts during the war and the Blackwater-Paravant contract.
Paravant was hired as a subcontractor by Raytheon for weapons training for the Afghan National Army. Raytheon Technical Services Co., Raytheon’s training unit, hired Paravant as part of its $11.2 billion Warfighter FOCUS (Field Operations Customer Support) program to integrate all the Army’s live, virtual and computer-model based training.
The investigation showed “reckless use of weapons by Blackwater/Paravant personnel, sloppy vetting by Paravant/Blackwater of their personnel, violation of the rules by Blackwater/Paravant personnel relative to obtaining weapons and carrying weapons in Afghanistan,” Levin said during a press briefing. “We also found inadequate oversight by the Army of this contract.”
To win support from Afghans in the current war, “we need to know that contractor personnel are adequately screened, are adequately supervised and they’re adequately held accountable,” Levin said.
“These were training personnel, not security personnel. They were not even supposed to be armed,” Levin said.
Fatal shooting in May 2009
Levin highlighted a May 5, 2009, incident in which two Paravant employees are alleged to have killed two Afghan civilians and injured a third. Justin Cannon and Christopher Drotleff were charged last month with second-degree murder, attempted murder and weapons charges. The committee sought to examine the “environment” that existed before the incident, Levin said, and found that “Paravant personnel recklessly used their weapons before that.”
Specifically, on Dec. 9, 2008, at Camp Darulaman, near Kabul, one Paravant employee shot another in the head when the former jumped on a moving vehicle with his weapon in an attempt to “learn how to shoot” from a vehicle, according to Levin. The victim was seriously injured, flown to Germany and is partially paralyzed, Levin said.
Paravant reported the incident to Raytheon the same day, and Raytheon filed a report in a system used by the Army’s Program Executive Office for Simulation Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI) to monitor the Raytheon contract. That report said the contributing causes of the shooting were “operating equipment improperly and without authority” and “improper technique,” and said safety training wasn’t followed. But the report failed to set off alarms at the program executive office, and the office only learned they’d been sent Paravant’s report when the Senate committee asked about it, about 10 months later, according to Levin’s statement.
“If the shooting had been investigated, PEO STRI would have seen that Paravant personnel were using weapons improperly and unsafely, with inadequate supervision, and that they were carrying weapons that they weren’t even supposed to have,” Levin said in the statement. “If corrective actions had been taken in December, the May 2009 shooting could have been avoided.”
The committee also said Blackwater broke weapons rules by diverting pistols from a contract Blackwater had with Lockheed Martin to the contract with Raytheon, for use by Paravant employees. Blackwater employees knew they didn’t have permission to carry those weapons, according to Levin’s statement. They also took weapons meant for the Afghan National Police from a U.S. weapons facility near Kabul, called Bunker 22 or 22 Bunkers, in late 2007 and early 2008. Blackwater acquired weapons from the facility for its training, security and aviation companies in Afghanistan, including more than 500 AK47s from the facility.
Blackwater is still in the process of returning some of the weapons, Levin said at the press conference.
Employees’ backgrounds criticized
The committee also said there were several instances, some already reported in the media, of Blackwater failing to effectively vet its personnel. The backgrounds of Drotleff and Cannon, the two employees involved in the May 2009 shooting, should have raised flags, according to Levin’s statement. Drotleff’s military record included instances of assault, larceny, insubordinate conduct and absence without leave; Cannon was discharged from the military after he was absent for 22 days without leave and tested positive for cocaine. A Paravant assistant team leader, Sebastian Kucharski, was fired from Blackwater’s now-ended security contract in Iraq after drinking alcohol and fighting with another contractor, according to Levin’s statement. Blackwater put him on an internal “do not use” list, but Kucharski was hired for Paravant anyway, then fired for fighting with military personnel at Camp Darulaman, according to the statement.
Paravant’s subcontract with Raytheon expired last year and wasn’t renewed, sources said. After the May 2009 shooting, Raytheon sent Paravant a “show cause” notice for failing to maintain “sufficient command, control and oversight of its personnel.” Paravant responded that “If [Raytheon] believes that Paravant has an obligation to supervise all subcontractor personnel at all times … Paravant will need to submit a request for equitable adjustment for the additional personnel, security and other costs of providing such ‘24-7’ supervision throughout Afghanistan,” according to Levin’s statement.
Former Paravant employees and current employees from Raytheon and Xe were set to testify Feb. 24 at the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. Two other Blackwater employees — the company’s former armorer, Jerry Stratton; and the current Xe country manager in Afghanistan, Ricky Chambers — were asked to testify before the committee but declined, saying they would invoke their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, according to Levin’s statement. Both men were involved in the illicit transfer of guns from Bunker 22, the statement said.
“Hopefully, this hearing is going to lead to dramatically better oversight, as well as much more care in who we contract with, looking at backgrounds of contractors before we contract with them,” Levin said at the press conference.
Raytheon released the following statement in response to the inquiry: “It would be inappropriate for us to comment prior to testimony, which is the purpose of the SASC hearing.”
Calls to Xe, which adopted its new name in 2009, were not returned by Tuesday night.
More... (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/02/defense_xe_hearing_022310m/)
[Clicking on more will open up a popup box with the complete news story from the news source. MilitaryWoman.org is not responsible for content.]
An investigation into a unit of security contractor Xe, formerly known as Blackwater, shows the company didn’t properly vet the people it hired for a training contract in Afghanistan, employees recklessly used firearms they weren’t authorized to have and the Army didn’t provide sufficient oversight of those contractors when mistakes were reported, according to a statement released Tuesday by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, D-Mich.
The 11-page statement summarized the findings of an investigation the committee started six months ago into armed contractors and a unit of Blackwater called Paravant. Levin released the statement one day before a Senate hearing to address security contracts during the war and the Blackwater-Paravant contract.
Paravant was hired as a subcontractor by Raytheon for weapons training for the Afghan National Army. Raytheon Technical Services Co., Raytheon’s training unit, hired Paravant as part of its $11.2 billion Warfighter FOCUS (Field Operations Customer Support) program to integrate all the Army’s live, virtual and computer-model based training.
The investigation showed “reckless use of weapons by Blackwater/Paravant personnel, sloppy vetting by Paravant/Blackwater of their personnel, violation of the rules by Blackwater/Paravant personnel relative to obtaining weapons and carrying weapons in Afghanistan,” Levin said during a press briefing. “We also found inadequate oversight by the Army of this contract.”
To win support from Afghans in the current war, “we need to know that contractor personnel are adequately screened, are adequately supervised and they’re adequately held accountable,” Levin said.
“These were training personnel, not security personnel. They were not even supposed to be armed,” Levin said.
Fatal shooting in May 2009
Levin highlighted a May 5, 2009, incident in which two Paravant employees are alleged to have killed two Afghan civilians and injured a third. Justin Cannon and Christopher Drotleff were charged last month with second-degree murder, attempted murder and weapons charges. The committee sought to examine the “environment” that existed before the incident, Levin said, and found that “Paravant personnel recklessly used their weapons before that.”
Specifically, on Dec. 9, 2008, at Camp Darulaman, near Kabul, one Paravant employee shot another in the head when the former jumped on a moving vehicle with his weapon in an attempt to “learn how to shoot” from a vehicle, according to Levin. The victim was seriously injured, flown to Germany and is partially paralyzed, Levin said.
Paravant reported the incident to Raytheon the same day, and Raytheon filed a report in a system used by the Army’s Program Executive Office for Simulation Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI) to monitor the Raytheon contract. That report said the contributing causes of the shooting were “operating equipment improperly and without authority” and “improper technique,” and said safety training wasn’t followed. But the report failed to set off alarms at the program executive office, and the office only learned they’d been sent Paravant’s report when the Senate committee asked about it, about 10 months later, according to Levin’s statement.
“If the shooting had been investigated, PEO STRI would have seen that Paravant personnel were using weapons improperly and unsafely, with inadequate supervision, and that they were carrying weapons that they weren’t even supposed to have,” Levin said in the statement. “If corrective actions had been taken in December, the May 2009 shooting could have been avoided.”
The committee also said Blackwater broke weapons rules by diverting pistols from a contract Blackwater had with Lockheed Martin to the contract with Raytheon, for use by Paravant employees. Blackwater employees knew they didn’t have permission to carry those weapons, according to Levin’s statement. They also took weapons meant for the Afghan National Police from a U.S. weapons facility near Kabul, called Bunker 22 or 22 Bunkers, in late 2007 and early 2008. Blackwater acquired weapons from the facility for its training, security and aviation companies in Afghanistan, including more than 500 AK47s from the facility.
Blackwater is still in the process of returning some of the weapons, Levin said at the press conference.
Employees’ backgrounds criticized
The committee also said there were several instances, some already reported in the media, of Blackwater failing to effectively vet its personnel. The backgrounds of Drotleff and Cannon, the two employees involved in the May 2009 shooting, should have raised flags, according to Levin’s statement. Drotleff’s military record included instances of assault, larceny, insubordinate conduct and absence without leave; Cannon was discharged from the military after he was absent for 22 days without leave and tested positive for cocaine. A Paravant assistant team leader, Sebastian Kucharski, was fired from Blackwater’s now-ended security contract in Iraq after drinking alcohol and fighting with another contractor, according to Levin’s statement. Blackwater put him on an internal “do not use” list, but Kucharski was hired for Paravant anyway, then fired for fighting with military personnel at Camp Darulaman, according to the statement.
Paravant’s subcontract with Raytheon expired last year and wasn’t renewed, sources said. After the May 2009 shooting, Raytheon sent Paravant a “show cause” notice for failing to maintain “sufficient command, control and oversight of its personnel.” Paravant responded that “If [Raytheon] believes that Paravant has an obligation to supervise all subcontractor personnel at all times … Paravant will need to submit a request for equitable adjustment for the additional personnel, security and other costs of providing such ‘24-7’ supervision throughout Afghanistan,” according to Levin’s statement.
Former Paravant employees and current employees from Raytheon and Xe were set to testify Feb. 24 at the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. Two other Blackwater employees — the company’s former armorer, Jerry Stratton; and the current Xe country manager in Afghanistan, Ricky Chambers — were asked to testify before the committee but declined, saying they would invoke their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, according to Levin’s statement. Both men were involved in the illicit transfer of guns from Bunker 22, the statement said.
“Hopefully, this hearing is going to lead to dramatically better oversight, as well as much more care in who we contract with, looking at backgrounds of contractors before we contract with them,” Levin said at the press conference.
Raytheon released the following statement in response to the inquiry: “It would be inappropriate for us to comment prior to testimony, which is the purpose of the SASC hearing.”
Calls to Xe, which adopted its new name in 2009, were not returned by Tuesday night.
More... (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/02/defense_xe_hearing_022310m/)
[Clicking on more will open up a popup box with the complete news story from the news source. MilitaryWoman.org is not responsible for content.]